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dence in his judicial system. The Commission system also adds some
needed bite to the Code of Judicial Conduct. In light of the judicial
commission cases from other jurisdictions, the North Carolina system
seems unlikely to run afoul of the due process and equal protection
challenges raised by the Crutchfield dissent. There are, nevertheless,
some jurisdictional problems posed by the judicial article of the North
Carolina Constitution. Hopefully, the General Assembly will remedy
these problems, or the court will find a way to reconcile them, so that
the Commission can fulfill its promise in North Carolina.
EDWIN WAPREN SMALL
Property Law-The Beneficiary's Rights to the Proceeds of an
Insurance Policy When He Takes the Life of the Insured
Enacted in 1961, Chapter 31A of the North Carolina General
Statutes precludes one who is convicted of a wilful and unlawful homi-
cide from acquiring a proprietary benefit because of the death of his
victim.' In Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
life insurance provisions of this chapter.' Faced with the issue whether
1. Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. REv. 175, 193 (1962).
2. 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
3. For the purposes of this note the relevant sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A
(1966) are:
§ 31A-3. Definitions.-As used in this article, unless the context other-
wise requires, the term-
(3) "Slayer" means
a. Any person who by a court of competent jurisdiction shall have
been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact of the
wilful and unlawful killing of another person; ....
§ 31A-11. Insurance benefits.-(a) Insurance and annuity proceeds pay-
able to the slayer:
(1) As the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insur-
ance on the life of the decedent, or
(2) In any other manner payable to the slayer by virtue of his surviving
the decedent, shall be paid to the person or persons who would
have been entitled thereto as if the slayer had predeceased the
decedent.
31A-13.-Record determining slayer admissible in evidence.-The rec-
ord of the judicial proceeding in which the slayer was determined to be such,
pursuant to § 3 1A-3 of this chapter, shall be admissible in evidence for or
against a claimant of property in any civil action arising under this chapter.
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a beneficiary who had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter for
the killing of the insured could retain the proceeds of the insurance
policy, the court held that proof of a conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter did not disqualify the beneficiary under the statute. 4  Never-
theless, because the statute was not intended to supplant completely
the common law in this area,' the court, in an unprecedented holding,
concluded that such a conviction was sufficient to bar the beneficiary
on the common-law principle that "no one shall be allowed to profit
from his own wrong."'
Jill Quick, having shot and killed her husband, Gary Quick, was
indicted for murder, convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and sen-
tenced to serve five to seven years in state prison. At the time of the
killing, Jill was the named beneficiary of an insurance policy in the
amount of $10,000 on the life of her husband. The present case
arose when the administratrix of her husband's estate brought an action
for declaratory judgment to determine the ownership of the life insur-
ance proceeds. Named as defendants in the action were Jill Quick
and United Benefit Life Insurance Company. The insurance company,
however, was permitted to withdraw after paying the proceeds to the
clerk of superior court.7
§ 31A-15. Chapter to be broadly construed.-This chapter shall not be
considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect
the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own
wrong. As to all acts specifically provided for in this chapter, the rules,
remedies, and procedures herein specified shall be exclusive, and as to all acts
not specifically provided for in this chapter, all rules, remedies, and pro-
cedures, if any, which now exist or hereafter may exist either by virtue of
statute, or by virtue of the inherent powers of any court of competent juris-
diction, or otherwise, shall be applicable.
4. 287 N.C. at 54, 213 S.E.2d at 567.
5. Id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
6. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570-71. Under the statute, a beneficiary who is pre.
cluded from receiving the proceeds of insurance on the life of the insured cannot receive
these proceeds indirectly as an heir of the insured's estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-
4 (1966). This section confirms prior North Carolina case law. E.g., Parker v. Potter,
200 N.C. 348, 354, 157 S.E. 68, 71 (1931). In other states, however, there is authority
to the contrary. E.g., Moore v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 570, 21 A.2d 42
(1941).
7. 287 N.C. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564. As a general rule, an insurance company
is not relieved of its obligation to pay the proceeds of the policy when the beneficiary
kills the insured. See, e.g., Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918). There are exceptions, however, (1) if the policy contains provisions voiding it
when the beneficiary causes the death of the insured, Grand Circle Women of Woodcraft
v. Rausch, 24 Colo. App. 304, 134 P. 141 (1913); (2) if the beneficiary obtained the
policy fraudulently, that is, intending at the time he procured it to kill the insured, Gold-
stein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 225 App. Div. 642, 234 N.Y.S. 250 (1929), modifying
133 Misc. 106, 231 N.Y.S. 161 (1928); see Henderson v. Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 100,
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At trial, neither party introduced evidence as to the factual circum-
stances immediately preceding the death of the insured." The only
evidence before the court that related to the killing was the record of
Jill's conviction of involuntary manslaughter which was submitted with-
out objection from the defendant. Based on this evidence and a stipu-
lation of the parties that the only issue to be decided was whether Jill
was barred under the statute,9 the court concluded that involuntary
manslaughter was an unlawful and wilful killing within the meaning of
section 31A-3(3)a of the General Statutes.'" Hence, Jill's conviction
of involuntary manslaughter disqualified her as a "slayer" under the
statute. Alternatively, the court held that apart from any statutory
grounds for forfeiture, Jill was barred from retaining the proceeds on
the basis of common-law doctrine and public policy." In light of these
two conclusions of law, the trial court entered judgment ordering the
clerk of superior court to pay the proceeds to the ancillary administra-
tor.12  Jill appealed,'" and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed on the grounds that involuntary manslaughter is not a wilful
killing within the meaning of the statute 4 and that the enactment of
the statute had abrogated otherwise applicable common-law rules.' 5
On further appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that a
"wilful killing' as used in section 31A-3 of the North Carolina General
Statutes means an intentional homicide, and thus, a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter does not, per se, bar recovery of the pro-
ceeds.' 6 The court, however, reversed the conclusion of the court of
appeals that the enactment of the statute had supplanted the common
law, holding instead that "G.S. § 31A-15 preserved the common law
179 S.E. 680 (1935); or (3) if the beneficiary is the only person having an interest
in the policy, Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910) (dictum). Ac-
cord, 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAw oF TRUSTS § 494.2 (3d ed. 1967). These exceptions would
still have application under chapter 31A since the statute uses the word "proceeds" and
a court faced with this issue could hold that no proceeds had accrued. [N.C.] GEN-
ERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT ON AN ACT TO BE ENTITLED "ACTS BAR-
RING PROPERTY RIGHTs" 26 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT].
8. 281 N.C. at 58, 213 S.E.2d at 570.
9. Id. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564.
10. Id. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 565.
11. Id.
12. Because Ida Mae Quick was a resident of South Carolina, an ancillary admin-
istrator, Lester G. Carter, Jr., was appointed. Id. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564.
13. 23 N.C. App. 504, 209 S.E.2d 323 (1974).
14. Id. at 505, 209 S.E.2d at 324.
15. Id. at 507, 209 S.E.2d at 325. Judge Campbell dissented on grounds that sec-
tion 31A-15 controlled and Jill Quick's act was an unlawful killing which would bar re-
covery. Id.
16. 287 N.C. at 54, 213 S.E.2d at 567.
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both substantively and procedurally, as to all acts not specifically pro-
vided for in Chapter 3 1A."
Having determined that common law applied, the court confronted
the issue whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to bar
recovery under North Carolina common law. The court held that al-
though the record of a criminal conviction was generally not admissible
in a common-law proceeding,"8 the trial judge did not err in consider-
ing such evidence because Jill had failed to object to its admission.'0
Moreover, the court concluded that such evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court's conclusion that Jill was disqualified under the
common law since "[clulpable negligence proximately resulting in
death comes within the purview of the common law maxim that no one
shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong." 20  Accordingly, the
supreme court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the trial
court's original judgment.2
In Quick the court grounded its decision barring defendant on a
maxim that has been the source of many common-law rules and statu-
tory provisions disqualifying a beneficiary from receiving insurance pro-
ceeds when he has killed the insured.22 Several problems frequently
arise in applying these common-law and statutory rules to particular
cases. The principal concerns are the type of homicide that will disqual-
ify the killer and the admissibility of the criminal conviction record in
the civil proceeding.23
17. Id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
118. Id. at 57, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
19. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570.
20. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 571.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., cases cited notes 25-28 and statutes cited notes 36 & 37 infra. See
generally Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. Rnv. 175 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Bolich]; Grossman, Liability and Rights of the Insurer Where the Death of the
Insured is Caused by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee, 10 B.U.L. REV. 281 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as Grossman]; Lipscomb, Insurer's Liability and Rights When In-
sured's Death is Caused by the Beneficiary or Assignee, 8 Miss. L.J. 476 (1936); Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 H~av.
L. REv. 715 (1936); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 794 (1961).
23. A third problem is who is entitled to the insurance proceeds when the benefi-
ciary is determined to be a slayer. The answer to this question depends on factors such
as the relation of the beneficiary to the insured and the provisions of the insurance pol-
icy. If the beneficiary is not the insured's next of kin, generally the beneficiary will
hold the proceeds as constructive trustee for the estate of the insured. 5 A. ScoTr, T
LAw oF Thus'rs § 494.1 (3d ed. 1967) and cases cited therein. On the other hand, if
the beneficiary is the next of kin, the majority of the courts have held that the proceeds
are to pass as if the beneficiary predeceased the insured. Id. Accordingly, the person
next in line of succession would take, or if there were no possible takers other than the
beneficiary the proceeds would escheat to the state. Id.
1088 [Vol. 54
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With respect to the first of these questions, the maxim itself provides
no logical point at which to draw the line.2" Applied literally, it could
encompass all wrongs from premeditated murder to mere accident. 25
In the absence of a statute, however, courts uniformly hold that a bene-
ficiary is not prohibited from taking insurance proceeds when the act
causing death is merely a civil wrong.26 At the other end of the scale,
it is virtually certain that a beneficiary who kills the insured for the pur-
pose of acquiring the proceeds would be barred.27  Between these ex-
tremes there is at least some surface disagreement as to the test to be
applied in determining which acts will preclude recovery. Several
cases have held that the killing of the insured under circumstances that
would constitute the crime of murder is sufficient to bar recovery;28
other decisions hold specifically that manslaughter does not disqualify.29
Finally, if the primary beneficiary murders the insured and there is a contingent
beneficiary named in the policy, the contingent beneficiary will take the proceeds.
Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931). But see Bullock v. Expressmen's
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71 (1951), in which the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held that when a policy designated a contingent beneficiary to take
if the primary beneficiary failed to survive the insured, and the primary beneficiary
feloniously killed the insured, the failure of the contingency to occur prevented the con-
tingent beneficiary from receiving the proceeds which passed to the insured's estate. Ac-
cord, Beck v. Downey, 191 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1951), vacated per curiam, 343 U.S. 912
(1952).
24. Grossman, supra note 22, at 290.
25. Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 5, 3 N.E.2d 17, 18-19 (1936).
26. E.g., Schreiner v. High Court Catholic Order of Foresters, 35 I1. App.
576 (1890). The beneficiary also is not disqualified when the killing is justifiable
or excusable. E.g., Holdom v. Grand Lodge of Ancient Order of United Workmen, 159
Ill. 619, 43 N.E. 772 (1895) (insanity); American Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Shaddinger,
205 La. 11, 16 So. 2d 889 (1944) (self-defense); Campbell v. Ray, 102 N.J. Super. 235,
245 A.2d 761 (Ch. Div. 1968), affd per curiam, 109 N.J. Super. 509, 259 A.2d 473
(App. Div. 1969).
27. E.g., Goldstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 Misc. 106, 231 N.Y.S. 161
(1928), modified on other grounds, 225 App. Div. 642, 234 N.Y.S. 250 (1929); see New
York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886). Although these cases hold
that the existence of a purpose to obtain the proceeds is sufficient to disqualify a benefi-
ciary, they do not say whether such a motive is required. That such a purpose is neces-
sary has been suggested in a few concurring and dissenting opinions in cases not directly
in point. Grossman, supra note 22, at 285, citing Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349,
128 N.W. 292 (1910) (concurring opinion); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W.
1042 (1904) (dissenting opinion). Other cases indicate that a purpose to accelerate the
maturity of the policy is not necessary. Grossman at 286, citing Schreiner v. High
Court Catholic Order of Foresters, 35 Ill. App. 576 (1890) (dictum); Smith v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 Misc. 136, 203 N.Y.S. 173 (1923), aff'd, 125 Misc.
670, 211 N.Y.S. 755 (1925) (dictum); cf. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 378, 137
S.E. 188, 191 (1927) (dictum).
28. E.g., Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800 (1900); Slo-
cum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923). See also Gar-
ner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948).
29. E.g., Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936); see
RESTATEMENT OF RESTIrION § 187, comment e at 766-67 (1937).
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Although these cases seem to indicate that the determinative factor
is whether the homicide involved is technically murder or some lesser
criminal offense, the few cases that have directly considered what ele-
ments are necessary to bar the beneficiary have held that the true test
is whether the beneficiary intentionally killed the insured. 0 As one
court noted in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McDavid,
31
"the real reason for not permitting recovery is that the beneficiary
intentionally took the life of the insured and that the intentional act
should not place the beneficiary in position to enjoy a benefit which
would not have been enjoyed and could not have been enjoyed except
for the wicked intentional killing. 32
In the North Carolina cases on point, the rule generally has been
stated to the effect that a beneficiary is barred who "feloniously takes"
the life of the insured.3" While a felonious act in the criminal law con-
text includes involuntary manslaughter,34 the decisions in North Caro-
lina, and in other jurisdictions where similar statements of the rule
exist, indicate that courts have not used the word "felonious" in the
strict criminal law sense but had in mind an intentional homicide.35
30. E.g., Tippens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1938);
Schreiner v. High Court Catholic Order of Foresters, 35 IIl. App. 576 (1890);
Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966); Schifanelli
v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974); cf. Wells v. Harris, 414 S.W.2d 343
(Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1967).
31. 39 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
32. Id. at 232; accord, Throop v. Western Indemnity Co., 49 Cal. App. 322, 193
P. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920). See also United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847,
852 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
33. E.g., Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71
(1951); Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (1969) provides:
Punishment for manslaughter.-If any person shall commit the crime of
manslaughter he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail or
State prison for not less than four months nor more than twenty years:
Provided, however, that in cases of involuntary manslaughter, the punishment
shall be in the discretion of the court, and the defendant may be fined or
imprisoned, or both.
In State v. Dunn, 208 N.C. 333, 180 S.E. 708 (1935), the North Carolina Supreme
Court in an opinion by Justice Brogden held that the proviso to section 14-18 was in-
tended merely to mitigate punishment for involuntary manslaughter and did not make
involuntary manslaughter a separate offense classifiable as a misdemeanor.
35. In Parker, for example, a statement by the court that "if a husband insures
his life for the benefit of his wife and afterwards feloniously takes her life, neither he
nor his estate will be permitted to profit by his wrong," 200 N.C. at 352, 157 S.E. at
70 (emphasis added), is followed by a series of examples that suggest that the court
was referring to an intentional killing. Id. Moreover, the court cited New York Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886), a case that also contains language
that "strongly suggests that the court had in mind an intentional taking." Grossman,
supra note 22, at 289. But see Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53
(1910), in which the supreme court noted that "[ilt is a principle very generally ac-
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Thus, historically, the dividing line between homicides that bar recov-
ery and those that do not has been drawn short of involuntary
manslaughter both by the North Carolina courts and courts in other
jurisdictions.
Several states have enacted statutes that deal expressly with this
problem, and, of course, in these jurisdictions the language of the stat-
ute controls.3 6 Although these statutes lack uniformity in describing the
acts that will bar recovery, 37 the courts, in interpreting them, generally
have agreed that they apply only to intentional killings.38
An additional issue raised where such statutes are in force is wheth-
er they are intended to abrogate the common law. Most courts have held
cepted that a beneficiary who has caused or procured the death of the insured under
circumstances amounting to a felony will be allowed no recovery on the policy." Id.
at 2, 67 S.E. at 53 (emphasis added). Apparently, this statement of the rule explains
the dictum in the court of appeals' opinion in Quick that Jill Quick could not have re-
covered on the policy if the statute had not superseded the common law. 23 N.C. App.
at 507, 209 S.E.2d at 325. However, the precise issue in Anderson was whether the
estate of a beneficiary could recover on a life insurance policy when the beneficiary mur-
dered the insured and committed suicide. Thus, for felonies other than murder, the rule
stated in Anderson is merely dictum. Moreover, as noted by Grossman in cases such
as Anderson, "the requirement that the homicide be wilful as well as felonious usually
appears more or less definitely from the language of the decisions as a whole." Gross-
man at 289. (emphasis added). See also Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245
Mass, 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923); Johnson v. Metropolitan Life, 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E.
865 (1919). In addition, where statutes simply require that the killing be felonious, the
courts have interpreted this to mean an intentional killing. E.g., Dowdell v. Bell, 477
P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1970); accord, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163
N.W.2d 289 (1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curiam, 395 U.S. 161 (1969).
In Thompson, the court in interpreting a statute that disqualified a beneficiary who "fe-
loniously takes" the life of the insured, held that "the statute is meant to apply to those
wrongdoers who intentionally cause the wrong and not to those who have been negli-
gent." Id. at 557, 163 N.W.2d at 296; accord, Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959), modified on other grounds, 182 F. Supp.
633 (D. Kan. 1960). See also Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 808, 810-
11 (D. Ore. 1952).
36. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-
5 (1962); W. VA. CoDn ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966).
37. E.g., IowA CoDE ANN. § 633.536 (1964) (feloniously takes); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-5 (1962) (unlawfully kills). The South Carolina statute specifically exempts in-
voluntary manslaughter.
38. E.g., Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1970) in which the court held that
although the word "intentionally" is not used in the Wyoming statute, the statute codifies
the common law, which historically was limited to intentional and felonious acts causing
the death of the insured. Id. at 172; accord, Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex.
166, 221 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1949); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547,
163 N.W.2d 289 (1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curiam, 395 U.S. 161
(1969). But cf. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918). At the time
of the Hamblin decision, however, the Kansas statute made conviction of any killing a
bar. Id. at 509, 175 P. at 678-79. The statute was amended to require a felonious kill-
ing which has been interpreted to mean an intentional homicide. Rosenberger v. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959), modified on other
grounds, 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960).
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that the statutes only supplement common-law rules and do not
supplant them.39 Thus, when the act of the beneficiary is not specifi-
cally barred by the statute, it is still possible to prohibit recovery if it
is shown that the beneficiary intended to kill the insured.40
A second problem encountered by courts when the beneficiary kills
the insured involves the admissibility and weight to be accorded the
record of the criminal conviction in the civil proceeding. As a general
rule of evidence, the judgment of conviction is neither admissible nor
conclusive.41 The reasons given by the courts for this rule of exclu-
sion include lack of mutuality,42 the fact that the record of convic-
tion is hearsay,43 and differences in the burdens of proof44 and in the
rules as to competency of witnesses in criminal and civil proceedings."
Thus, in the absence of a statute, a party seeking to bar a beneficiary
must produce evidence of the circumstances surrounding the killing in
39. See, e.g., Keels v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 159 S.C. 520, 157 S.E. 834 (1931);
Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill,
115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934). But see Rose v. Rose, 79 N.M. 435, 444 P.2d
762 (1968).
40. See cases cited note 39 supra.
41. E.g., Beckworth v. Phillips, 6 Ga. App. 859, 65 S.E. 1075 (1909) (not con-
clusive); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301
(1922) (not admissible). The North Carolina cases follow this rule. E.g., Watters v.
Parrish, 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960); see cases cited in 1 D. STANSBuRY, NORTH
CAROLNA EVIDENCE § 143 (H. Brandis rev. 1973). There is an exception to this rule
when a convicted criminal attempts to profit from his crime in a civil action. In such
instances, some courts have held that a criminal conviction record is admissible, see, e.g.,
Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932), and others have held
that the judgment of conviction is conclusive. E.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130,
125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
42. E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289
(1968), appeal dismissed and cert. .denied per curtam, 395 U.S. 161 (1969); In-
terstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922). The
courts have held that there is no mutuality of estoppel because the defendant in the crim-
inal case could not have used an acquittal in the subsequent civil action. Clearly, it
is reasonable to deny giving conclusive effect to an acquittal in the civil proceeding, if
not to exclude it entirely, because of the differences in the burdens of proof and the
parties in the two proceedings. However, when the defendant has been convicted by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt after having a full opportunity to present his case, it
would seem both logical and convenient to allow the conviction at least to be used in
the civil case. Apparently, however, the courts in denying the use of the judgment of
conviction have found the desirability for preserving symmetry in the law more compel-
ling.
43. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curfam, 395 U.S. 161 (1969). See also 1 D.
STA 1sBURy, NoamH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 143 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
44. E.g., Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 127 S.E.2d 900 (1962); State v. Roach,
83 Kan. 606, 112 P. 150 (1910).
45. SPECIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 29; see Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 127
S.E.2d 900 (1962). See also Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156,
112 S.E. 301 (1922).
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order to establish a prima facie case.4"
Where statutes have been enacted their language controls the use
of the criminal conviction in the subsequent civil proceeding. If a stat-
ute does not require a criminal conviction in order to bar recovery, the
court in the civil case must itself determine whether the killer was guilty
of a proscribed homicide.47  In such instances, the criminal conviction
is not admissible to prove guilt for the same reasons applicable where
no statute is in effect.48  On the other hand, when the statute defines
a slayer as one who has been convicted of a wilful homicide, the
principle issue in the civil action is simply whether the person has been
so convicted. 49  As the court noted in Quick, where such statutes are
in effect, the record of the conviction is admissible in the civil action
"not to prove guilt, but to prove the conviction as a separate relevant
fact which would of itself bar the beneficiary from acquiring or retain-
ing the proceeds. 50
The court in Quick resolved many of the problems that arise when
a beneficiary takes the life of the insured. In many respects, the
opinion of the court merely reiterates well established common-law
rules. In particular, the holding that a criminal conviction record is not
admissible in a common-law civil proceeding is clearly supported by the
weight of authority in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions.5 '
Similarly, the holdings of the court that the statute applies only to inten-
tional homicides and was not intended to supplant the common law are
consistent not only with the legislative history of the statute52 but also
with the majority of decisions of other courts interpreting similar
statutes.53
However, the conclusion of the court that "culpable negligence" is
sufficient to bar recovery at common law marks an unprecedented
extension of the rule disqualifying a beneficiary who caused the death
46. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. at 58, 213 S.E.2d at 570. See
also Lillie v. Modem Woodmen, 89 Neb. 1, 130 N.W. 1004 (1911).
47. See 5 A. SCoTT, THE LAW oF TRUSTS § 492.4, at 3508 (3d ed. 1967).
48. SPEcuIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
49. Id. at 29-30; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 &E.
188 (1934).
50. 287 N.C. at 57, 213 S.E.2d at 569; accord, Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960), modifying 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan.
1959); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934). As
the court also notes in Quick, "evidence that the 'slayer' was not in fact guilty of the
crime would be both immaterial and inadmissible." 287 N.C. at 57, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
51. See cases cited note 41 supra.
52. 287 N.C. at 54-56, 213 S.E.2d at 568-69.
53. See cases cited notes 35, 38 & 39 supra.
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of the insured.54 The court cited no cases from North Carolina or other
jurisdictions supporting its conclusion. Instead, the court apparently
justified its holding on the basis of comments to the proposed act con-
tained in a report by the Special Drafting Committee of the General
Statutes Commission.re Specifically, the court seems to have relied on
the observation by the committee that "the fact that this Chapter covers
only certain acts of wrongful killing does not necessarily preclude other
wrongful acts from barring property rights by common law, such as
involuntary manslaughter or an acquitted killer in some cases."" The
court also quoted an article by Professor Bolich, a member of the Com-
mittee, in which he stated that "the fact that this chapter covers only
wilful and unlawful homicide does not necessarily preclude other
wrongful killings from barring property rights by common law, such as
an unintentional killing resulting from reckless disregard for human
life or during the commission of a felony. ' '1 7  Apparently, the court
inferred from the comments of the committee and the statement of Pro-
fessor Bolich that the common-law rule of North Carolina is that a bene-
ficiary convicted of involuntary manslaughter should not be allowed to
profit by his own wrong. Yet clearly, the purpose of these comments
was merely to insure that common-law remedies were preserved as to
acts not specifically provided under the statute. They are not ad-
dressed to the specific problem of what elements are necessary to
disqualify a beneficiary in a common-law proceeding and certainly do
not support the conclusion of the court that a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter alone is sufficient evidence to bar recovery of the
proceeds.
Moreover, other comments by the committee indicate that the better
public policy is simply to bar one who intentionally takes the life of
the insured. For example, in their comments on section 31A-3(1)a
the committee states that "[t]he requirement that the killing be wilful
and unlawful isn't the only possible rule, but does seem a fair policy
criterion."8 Furthermore, the opinion of the court contains a state-
54. See cases cited notes 30-32 supra.
55. [N.C.] GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT ON AN AcT TO BE
ENTITLED "Acs BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS" (1961). The members of the committee
were Fred B. McCall, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina Law School; W.
Bryan Bolich, Professor of Law, Duke University Law School; and Norman A. Wiggins,
Professor of Law, Wake Forest College Law School. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7,
at 1.
56. SPEcIAL REPORT at 31, quoted at 287 N.C. at 55, 213 S.F_.2d at 568.
57. Bolich, supra note 22, at 221, quoted at 287 N.C. at 55-56, 213 S.E.2d at 568.
58. SPECIAL REPORT at 12 (emphasis added).
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ment by Professor Bolich that "this section utilizes the criterion adopted
by a majority of the statutes and common law decisions on the subject-
an intentional criminal homicide. As an expression of public policy it
seems a fair standard which requires the killing to be both unlawful
and wilful."5
While it is true that both these statements relate specifically to
the meaning of the word "slayer" as used in the statute, the statutory
requirement that the killing be wilful in order to bar the beneficiary
is an expression of the public policy of the state preventing one who
intentionally kills another from unjustly enriching himself through his
criminal act. It would seem, therefore, that the same policy and the
same test should govern a proceeding at common law. In sum, the hold-
ing of the court that culpable negligence will bar recovery is not only
unprecedented but also arguably contrary to the intent of the legislature
and the public policy of North Carolina as expressed in the statute.
Even if one accepts this unique holding of the court, the result
reached in Quick is certainly inequitable on the facts of the case. At
trial both parties stipulated that the only issue to be decided was whether
Jill Quick was barred from taking the proceeds under chapter 31A.s1
Arguably, this stipulation could be viewed as an agreement by the
parties that Jill Quick was to be disqualified as a slayer under the stat-
ute or not at all. That is, the stipulation could be interpreted as a
waiver by the plaintiff administratrix of any common-law. remedy.61 In
that case, Jill should have been allowed to recover the proceeds since
she was not a slayer under the court's interpretation of the statute. The
court, however, held that it was not bound by the stipulation since it
was one of law.6 2  While it is true that the parties cannot stipulate as
59. Bolich, supra note 22, at 193-94, quoted at 287 N.C. at 52-53, 213 S.E.2d at
567 (emphasis added).
60. 287 N.C. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564.
61. In Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 193 S.E.2d 79 (1972), the court stated:
"'[s]tipulations will receive a reasonable construction with a view to effecting the in-
tent of the parties; but in seeking the intention of the parties, the language used will
not be so construed as to give the effect of an admission of a fact obviously intended
to be controverted, or the waiver of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished,
..' Id. at 380, 193 S.E.2d at 83 (emphasis added). See also J.L. Roper Lumber
Co. v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 137 N.C. 431, 49 S.E. 946 (1905).
If the parties had agreed that the stipulation was a waiver of the administratrix's
common law remedy, it seems that Jill would have objected to the trial court's second
conclusion of law on the grounds that it was contrary to the terms of the stipulation.
Thus, Quick's failure to object is evidence that there was no mutual intent that the stipu-
lation was to have the effect of a waiver of any common-law remedy.
62. 287 N.C. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
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to matters of law,63 they can limit the issues to be considered by relin-
quishing otherwise available rights.64 Thus, the manner in which the
court dispenses with the stipulation fails to give sufficient consideration
to the question whether the stipulation shows that the administratrix
intentionally waived any common-law remedy existing independent
of the statute.
Moreover, regardless of the legal effect of the stipulation, it is
evident from its terms that Jill was under the impression that the
"decisive question" was whether she was barred by the statute,"5 and
since the statute, contrary to the common law, made the conviction
record admissible, it is understandable that she failed to object.00
Furthermore, there was simply no way she reasonably could have
known that a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, even if admitted,
would have been sufficient to bar recovery since all the authorities indi-
cate that a person seeking a common-law remedy would have to prove
by the preponderance of evidence that she intentionally killed the
insured.67  Thus, the holding of the court that the record of the criminal
conviction though generally inadmissible was not only entitled to be
considered in the civil case but was also conclusive as to the issue
amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice.68
In conclusion, the supreme court in Quick v. United Benefit Life
Insurance Company provided "considerable guidance' in the resolution
of issues that often arise when a beneficiary of a life insurance policy
63. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 200 N.C. 300, 156 S.E. 806 (1931).
64. See Forbes v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1936).
65. 287 N.C. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
66. Moreover, it would not have been unreasonable for Jill Quick to have intro-
duced the conviction into evidence as a defense to her prosecution under the statute.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934).
67. See cases cited note 30 supra.
68. There are a few other explanations for the result reached by the court. First,
the court may have construed section 31A-15 to empower the courts to consider all the
circumstances of each case in determining whether the act of the defendant was the type
of unlawful killing that should prohibit recovery. That is, the legislature may have in-
tended that the courts adopt a "functional test," see Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105
F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Ore. 1952), in deciding these cases under which "intent" would
be an important but not necessarily determinative factor. Although such a test would
introduce considerable uncertainty into this area of the law, it potentially would avoid
the undesirable results which could be reached by barring any beneficiary who has acted
in a culpably negligent manner in causing the death of the insured. Second, the court
may have viewed the verdict of involuntary manslaughter as a compromise or sympathy
verdict-Jill being in fact guilty of murder. However, the only significant fact from
which the court could draw such an inference was the severity of the sentence handed
down by the judge. Finally, the court may not have wished to remand the case for a
hearing on the question of intent or for a new trial because of the likelihood that a new
round of litigation would sevdrely deplete the insurance proceeds.
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takes the life of the insured. Unfortunately, the benefits gained
through such guidance are more than offset by the unjust manner in
which the court reached its final result. Besides the unfairness on the
peculiar facts of this case, the abandonment of the heretofore univer-
sally recognized common-law test of intent to kill has the potential for
producing results that most courts and commentators would find
inequitable. 9 For example, under the rule laid down by the court in
Quick, a son whose reckless driving caused the death of his father
would not be allowed to recover any insurance proceeds accruing as
a result of his father's death.
It is submitted that the court should have remanded the case for a
hearing to determine whether Jill Quick intentionally killed the in-
insured. In disposing of the case in this manner, the court could have
avoided setting an unwarranted and inequitable precedent in North
Carolina.
JOHN MULL GARDNER
Real Property-Implied Warranty: Seller of Land Limited by
Restrictive Covenants Implicitly Warrants That the Land Was
Usable for the Restricted Purpose
In a case of first impression and without appellate court precedent
in any other jurisdiction,' the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the venerable maxim that in a sale of land by deed there are no implied
warranties.2 By extending the implied warranty concept developed for
new home sales,3 the court created a new substantive right based on
69. E.g., Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Ore. 1952).
1. Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102
(1975). But cf. Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (S. Ct.
1932) where it was held a landlord who specifically restricts the use of a leased premise
for one purpose guarantees the fitness of the premise for that particular purpose.
2. Huntley v. Waddell, 34 N.C. 33 (1851). In some states the prohibition against
implied warranties for real property is statutorily sanctioned. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 93.140 (1973). In these states it is unlikely that the decision of Hinson v. Jefferson,
287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) can be followed without statutory changes, implied
warranty cases for new homes notwithstanding. Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019
(1974) (en bane). For unlike the implied warranty in new home cases in which the
courts attempt to avoid merger and preserve the contractual obligations, the implied
warranty in Hinson is derived from the deed itself. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
3. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974). The case is analyzed
in Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quality in New Housing
Sales: New Protection for the North Carolina Homebuyer, 53 N.C.L. Rnv. 1090 (1975)
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